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Pohl and Mihaljek analyze the World Bank's  Uncertainties seem to be higher in the directly
experience with project analysis from a sample  productive sectors (agriculture and industry),
of 1,105 projects.  They compare estimated rates  where rates of return can be altered through
of return at appraisal with re-estimated rates of  external market forces or domestic policy
return at project completion (that is, at the  shocks.  Estimated rates of return seem more
completion of construction works, usually five to  stable for infrastructure projects.
ten years after appraisal).
One alternative to correcting modal esti-
Their findings confirm a high degree of  mates of implementation variables for "bad
uncertainty in project analysis.  Only a small part  surprises" might be to set different minimum
of the discrepancy between estimated rates of  rate-of-retum criteria for different types of
return at appraisal and the re-estimated rates of  projects (10 percent for transport, for example,
return at project completion can be explained,  but 15 percent for agricultural and industrial
even with the benefit of hindsight.  projects), based on observed divergences in rate
of retum.
World Bank appraisal estimates of rates of
return are too optimistic. But, explain Pohl and  Project analysis simply has to cope with a
Mihaljek, factors usually associated with this  large degree of uncertainty. Traditional methods
optimistic bias (cost overruns, implementation  of project evaluation and selection have been
delays) seem to explain only a small part of  unable to reduce this large measure of uncer-
unexpected changes in project perfonnance.  tainty.
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1.  Over the  past decades,  cost-benefit  analysis  has  become  a  otandard
appraisal  tool for  selecting  development  projects  at the  World  Bank  and  other
development  finance  institutions.  A  number  of governments  also  have  adopted
these  techniques  in the  planning  of public  investment  projects. In terms  of
methodology,  the World  Bank  broadly  follows  Little-Mirrleeo  (1968,  1974),  who
expanded  earlier  approaches  to cost-benefit  analysis  to take  account  of
economic  distortiono  typically  prevailing  in  developing  countries,  including
overvalued  exchange  rates,  tariffs  and  quantitative  import  restrictions,  high
commodity  taxes,  and  a general  shortage  of eavings,  particularly  for  public
sector  investment  projects. Squire  and  van  der  Tak (1975)  refined  the
methodology  further  to take account  of income  distribution  effects. More
recent  generalizations  and  refinements  of the  theory  of cost-benefit  analysis
are  reviewed,  for  example,  in Dreze  and  Stern  (1987)  and  Squire  (1989).
2.  The  main features  of the  Little-Mirrlees  methodology  include:  (a)
measuring  all  costs  and  benefito  at economic  (shadow)  prices}  (b)  uoing
international  prices  for  traded  goods;  (c)  decomposing  non-traded  goods  into
their  constituent  inputs  and  valuing  each  at its  shadow  price;  (d)  uoing
shadow  wage rates  that  reflect  the  output  foregone  in  alternative  uses and  the
higher  value  of public,  compared  to  private,  income; (s)  discounting  net
social  benefits  with an "accounting  rate  of interest"  that  would  just  ration-2-
investment  projects  in the  whole  economy  to the  funds  avaLlable  1/; and
finally,  (f)  uncertalnty  is to be taken  into  account  only  to the  extent  that
profitabiLity  io  expected  to be correlated  with  the general  state  of the
economy (Little and Mlrrlees,  1990).
3.  While  the  theory  of cost-benefit  analysie  provldes  a rlgorous
conceptual  framework  ln  which  to evaluate  publlc  expendLture  programs  and
lnvestment  projects,  practlcal  applications  depart  quite  substantlally  from
these  ideals,  as  some  of the  key  parameters  are  difflcult  to estlmate  ln
practlce.  In  theory,  for  example,  net  diecounted  beneflts.at  the  "accounting
rate  of  interest"  would  be the  approprlate  crlterlon  to decide  whether  to
carry  out  a  partLcular  project  in the  LLttle-MLrrlees  framework. In  practice,
it  is  quite  dlfficult  to  estimate  the  "accounting  rate  of interest"  reasonably
accurately  (see  e.g.,  Ray).  Equating  the  accounting  rate  of interest  with the
(highest)  rate  that just  exhausts  available  investment  funds,  as suggested
early  on by Little  and  MLrrlees,  is conceptually  clear  and  simple,  but few,  if
any,  developlng  countrles  have  a comprehensive  ranklng  of avallable  publlc
inveatment  opportunLtLes. Returns  on past  publlc  sector  investments  may  be
misleading  due  to poor investment  declesons  or inapproprlate  economic
pollcles. Project  proposals  by sectoral  agencles,  on the  other  hand,  may  be
"padded"  wlth optlmistlc  assumptions  and  imply  an exaggerated  rate  of return.
1/  The  type  of dLecount  rate  to be used in  cost-benefit  analysls  ls closely
associated  wLth  the c.holce  of the "num6raLre".  In  the  Llttle-Mlrrleeo
framework,  the  num6raire  is "uncommitted  public  income",  and  the "accountlng
rate  of Lnterest"  is linked  to the  opportunlty  cost  of capltal  as well as  the
consumptlon  rate  of lnterest. In  the alternatLve  UNIDO  formulatlon  (Daogupta,
Marglin,  and  Sen)  the  num6raire  is coneumption  and  the  appropriate  diecount
rate li  thus the  consumptlon  rate  of interest  (see  e.g.,  Ray  or Squire).-3-
4.  For  theme  and  other  reasons,  the  World  Bank  follows  the Little-
Mirtlees  rmethodology  only  broadly. Border  prices  are  generally  used for
traded  goods,  and  non-traded  goods  are  decomposed  into  direct  cost  elements
(see,  e.g.,  Inter-American  Development  Bank  for  a  practical  guide  to
calculating  sectoral  shadow  prices). Distributional  weights,  although
pioneered  at the  World  Bank,  are  rarely  used  in practice. Since  public-sector
and  economy-wide  rate-of-return  estimates  vary  considerably  across  countries
(depending  on endowments  and,  more importantly,  policies),  the  Bank  uses  the
"internal  rate  of return  calculated  at shadow  prices"  or, short,  the "economic
rate of return"  as an important,  but  not  exclusive,  decision  criterion. With
few  exceptions,  the  World  Bank  only  finances  projects  which  have  an  estimated
economic  rate of at least  10%  at  appraisal  (in  constant  prices). A somewhat
odd departure  from  the  principles  of cost-benefit  analysis  has  been  adopted  in
the electric  power  sector,  where  benefits  are  measured  not  at shadow  prices
(marginal  costs),  but  at actual  tariffs,  which  may considerably  underestimate
benefits  (and  thus  economic  rates  of return)  in  this sector  /.
5.  The Bank's  long  history  of project  financing  provides  a unique
opportanity  to quantify  the level  of  uncertainty  in public  sector  investment
projects  in developing  countries  and  to assess  the  effects  of cost-benefit
analysis  on investment  decisions. For  projects  that  are  reasonably  amenable
to quantification  of costs  and  benefits,  Bank  staff  calculate  economic  rates
of return  at appraisal  and  again  at project  "completion",  that is,  after
3/  This  does  not imply  inappropriate  investment  or financing  decisions,  since
power  project  proposals  usually  are  based  on a least-cost  investment
programming  exercise. It only  underestimates  rates  of return  of power
projects.-4-
construction  works  have  been completed  and  the  project  enters  into  normal
operations.
6.  For  more than  one  thousand  projects,  economic  rate  of return
estimates  now are  available  for  both  appraisal  and "completion"  (or  "start-
up").  The  difference  between  these  two  estimates  provides  an interesting
empirical  measure  of uncertainty  of development  projects  financed  by the  World
Bank.  J/  It should  be noted  that  the  re-estimated  rates  of return  are  not
yet  true ex-post  rates  of return,  since  they  are  made at the  start-up  of
normal  operations. In  view  of the long  life  of most investment  projects,  ex-
post  estimates  can  only  be made  in another  twenty  or thirty  years.  Re-
estimated  rates  of return  should,  however,  be closer  to true  ex-poet  rates  of
return,  as the  effect  of a number  of risks  already  is  known (investment  costs,
construction  delays,  initial  operating  performance,  etc.),  and later  costs  and
benefits  are  more heavily  discounted.  4/  However,  due to the  long life  of
most investment  projects,  the  relationship  between  ex-post  rates  of return  and
3/  of course,  projects  financed  by the  World  Bank  are  not  necessarily
representative  of public  sector  investments  in developing  countries. Projects
submitted  by Governments  for  Bank  financing  may primarily  include  projects
with above-average  rates  of return  and  below-average  risks. This  may  be
particularly  true in large  countries  (such  as India),  where  World  Bank
financed  projects  represent  only  a very small  part  of the  public  investment
program.
4/  The  re-estimated  rate  of return  is calculated  by the Bank's
organizational  unit  which  has appraised  and  supervised  the implementation  of
the project. Due  to normal  staff  turnover  (rotation),  appraisal  and  re-
estimates  are  usually  made by different  project  officers. The  staff  turnover
may improve  the honesty  of the  re-estimate,  but, at the  same  time,  it  may lead
to methodological  differences. The  effect  of these  factors  on  the rate  of
return  gap is  not known.-5-
re-estimated  rates  at completion  of construction  may be as loose  as the
relationship  between  appraisal  and  re-estimated  rates  of return.
7.  tIhile  a  considerable  degree  ot uncertainty  is  to be expected  in  the
implementation  of development  projects,  the  extent  of revealed  uncertainty  in
World  Bank  projects  is striking.  Estimates of economic rates of return at
appraisal  (AERR)  are relatively  poor  predictors  of re-eetimated  rates  of
return  (RERR) at  completion  of  construction  works,  with  appraiall  estlmates
explaining  only  about  20% of  the  variation  in  the  rs-estLmated  rates  of
return.  Figure  1  shows  this relation.hip  graphically. Projects  with
appraisal  or re-estimated  economic  rates  of return  over 40%  - &bout  8% of  all
projects  - have  been  omitted  for  greater  clarity.
8.  The  remainder  of this  paper  analyzes  the  differences  between
appraisal  and  re-estimated  rates  of return  with statistical  techniques  and
provides  some  initial  interpretation  of the results. Of course,  the
statistical  analysis  can  only  capture  factors  that are  measurable  and  arx
applicable  to all  types  of projects. This  approach  only  can  provide  an
overview  and  cannot  substitute  for  project  performance  audits  at the  project
level. The  rate  of return  of a copper  project,  for  example,  wlll  depend
strongly  on whether  actual  copper  price  developments  fulfill  appraieal
expectations. The closest  our  analysis  gets  to this  is through  inclusion  of a
composite  real  commodity-price  index  on  projects  in broad  sectors  (e.g.,
agriculture).-6-
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9.  The  analysis  in this  paper  is  based  largely  on a data  base  maintained
by the  Bank's  Operations  Evaluation  Department  (OED),  an independent  unit
reporting  directly  to the  Executive  Directors. The complete  data  set  includes
2,200  projects  for  which  "project  completion  reports"  had  been  issued  during-7-
1974-1987 by the reupective project department for audit by OED on a sample
basis.  For slightly more than half of thsee projects, economic rates of
return have b~een  calculated by the staff At  appraisal and project "completion"
(start-up of normal operations).  For the remaindar of the projects in the
data base, economic rates of return were not available, primarily because
quantification was deemed infeasible or unjustified.  Examples include a large
number of  small technical assistance credits, reconstruction loans financing
imports after natural or man-made calamities, structural adjustment loans in
support of policy reforms, and lines of credit to financial institutions (for
the latter, rates of return are calculated for sub-projects, but are not
aggregated).  A small number of projects were excluded because other key
variables were missing from the data set, or because other supplementary data
were not available (for  example, because the project financing has been
canceled by the recipient, or because the country has ceased to report
economic data).  The analysis thus was carried out with a final sample of
1,015 projects for which a complete data set was available.  The sample
selection is thus fairly objective and does not appear to bias the results.
The only systematic omission is financial intermediation projects, financing
numezous small and medium-scale industrial and agricultural projects.  A
similar analysis could, in principle, be carried out for financial
intermediation projects, but would involve considerable data collection
efforts.
10.  The OED data base was augmented by supplementary variables that were
believed to be important explanatory factors of project success, including the
Bank's internal ranking of economic management performance by country as of1978, a country-specific index of price distortiono for the 1970s (constructed
by Agarwala 1983), real commodity-price movements, p%.r  capita income, and
adult literacy rates.  The price distortion index was available for 31
countries accounting for 612 projects.  A separate ak!.lysis  was undertaken for
this smaller sample.  Sectoral and regional dummy (0,1)  variables also were
introduced as proxies for project characteristics and management performance.
11.  Table 1 presents the main descriptive statistics for the data set and
shows the wide v&riety of projects.  Econnmic rates of return are derived, as
explained above, as real internal rates of return at economic (shadow) prices.
Project costs in the data base are in nominal US dollars and range from about
$1 million to over $4 billion.  The largest number of projects is in
agriculture (40%), followed by transport (30%), energy (20%) and a  small
number of projects in industry and urban development.  The larger part of the
Bank's industrial lending is intermediated through financial institutions.
Unfortunately, average rates of return on financial intermediation lending are
not systematically available.  With the exception of construction costs, the
medians are fairly close to the averages for the data set.  Constant-dollar
cost data are not recorded in the data base, although they are available in
the project files and have been used to calculate the economic rates of
return.  Rather than sifting through 1,015 voluminous project files, we have
estimated implicit real costs from forecast and actual price deNelopments as
well as from other implementation data in the data base (see  the Annex).-9-
^^bl  1SatiscufAor...8forlQOC  World^  Bank  Pri*  a 
Standard
Mean  Median2  ximt  amm  peviation
Economic Rate of Return  (%)
At appraisal  22  18  158  1  33
At project "completion"  16  14  128  -20  13
Total Project Cost
(mil. US $, current prices)
At appraisal  86  34  3,193  1  185
At project completion  102  40  4,045  1  233
Nominal cost overrun  (%)  22  10  514  -89  46
Unexpected inflation (%)  2)  23  38  -2  7
Real cost overrun (%)  -6  -11  394  -91  34
Time overrun (years)  2  2  16  -4  2
Time overrur ;%)  58  46  465  -68  56
12.  There is considerable variation in the appraisal rates of return,
ranging from only 1% for a water supply project in Bombay, to 158% for a seed
project in India (which, by the way, had a re-estimated rate of return at
project completion of only 11%).  The wide range of rates of return  both at- 10
appraical (1% to 158%), and project "completion" (-20%  to 128%) i/ is
perhaps surprisLng.  In the more orderly world of economic theory and model-
building, one usually assumes that rates of return converge within a fairly
narrow range.  Ninety percent of all projects have appraisal rates of return
in the range of 10-40%, but only about half have re-estimated rates of return
within this range, highlighting the importance of uncertainty.  The average
rate of return of World Bank projects has behaved in a more orderly way,
averaging 22% at  appraisal  and 16% at project completion (Table 1), with
fairly small differences from year to year.
13.  World Bank projects have, on average, taken considerably more time to
implement (six  years) than expected at appraisal (four years), and project
costs in US dollars were, on average, 22% higher than estimated at appraisal,
despite ample physical and price contingencies built into project cost
estimates.  Project cost overruns and implementation delays thus could be
important factors in explaining project performance and the loose relationship
between rate-of-return estimates at appraisal and project completion.
5/  For about 5 percent of  all projects the re-estimated (internal) rates of
return are negative.  For many projects with negative rates of return these
are given as -5% in the data base, presumably because negative internal rates
are highly sensitive to small differences in assumptions, and truncation of
the time horizon.  Reasonably realistic assumptions will in most cases lead to
small (rather than large) negative numbers, as long as failed projects yield
some small excess of benefits over variable costs (i.e.  disregarding the
initial investment costs).  For example, at a discount rate of -10%, a benefit
of $  1 in year 20 would be compounded to $  6.7, or 45 times its present value
at discount rate of +10%.  However, if this small benefit is disregarded, the
calculated internal rate of return is minus infinity.  The economic
interprctation of negative internal rates of return in most cases  is a zero
rate of return (no increase in output for some large investment).  Only if
variable costs exceeded benefits (both at shadow prices) would one normally
speak of "negative" rates of return.  The latter case typically would be due
to domestic price distortions (negative value added at international prices).- 11  -
14.  While  the  average  re-estimated  rates  of return  are  satLfactory
(15.8%,  vs. 21.6%  at appraisal),  there  is  a large  number  of projects  with low
returns  (25%  of all  projects  have  re-estimated  rates  of return  below 10%;  14%
below 5%;  and 8t of all  projects  have  zero  or negative  rates  of return). This
suggests  that considerable  benefLts  could  be obtained  if it  were  possible  to
identify  the factors  that  lead  to project  failure. Defining  project  "failure"
is not  a simple  matter. Some  cut-off  point  for  rates  of return  has  to be
adopted  to distinguLsh  successful  from  unsuccessful  projects. In  the
Little/Mirrlees  framework,  that  cut-off  point  would  be relatively  high (say
10%)  due to the  choice  of the num6raire  (scarce  "uncommitted  public  income").
15.  Wlth the  help  of the  derived  real  project  costs  (Annex),  the reported
nominal  cost  overruns  were  decomposed  Lnto  two  parts:  (a)  unexpected  changes
in the  general  price  level  for  capital  goods;  and (b)  project-specific  real
cost  increases. The  latter  could  be due  either  to an error  in project  cost
estimates,  unforeseen  difficulties  and  expenditures,  or increases  in the  scope
of projects. Nominal  cost  overruns  mostly  are  explained  by unexpectedly  high
inflation  during  the  period  (primarlly  the 1970s),  with  actual  prices  being
19.8%  higher  than  projected  at appraisal. Perhaps  surprisingly,  the appraisal
cost  estimates  were,  on average,  too  high  in real  terms. Nominal  cost
overruns  thus are  primarily  due  to unexpectedly  high  inflation. Real cost
varLatLons  range  from  -90% (probably  largely  due  to cancellations  of project
components)  to increases  of nearly  400% (probably  reflecting  mainly  expansion
Ln  the scope  of projects,  rather  than faulty  cost calculations).
Statistical  Methodologv- 12 
16.  The divergence between the appraisal and re-estimated rates of return
has  been  analyzed with two types of linear regression.  The first consists of
regressing the re-estimated rates of return at project "completion" (i.e., at
the completion of construction and the start-up of normal operations) on the
appraisal rates of return and a number of other factors that are thought to
influence project performance.  Since both the appraisal and re-estimated
rates of return depend on the same set of other factors, this approach is best
interpreted in terms of a "seemingly unrelated regression" model. §/
17.  One statistical problem with the standard ordinary least squares
(OLS) estimation of this linear regression model is that residuals calculated
from the above data set do not have uniform variance and zero correlation with
one another, i.e., they are not homoskedastic. In the presence of
heteroskedasticity the OLS estimator remains unbiased, but it no longer has
minimum variance among all linear unbiased estimators.  Also, the usual
formula for the variance-covariance matrix of OLS estimators is incorrect,
and, therefore, the usual estimator of their variance is biased, implying that
interval estimation and hypothesis testing using these estimators no longer
can be trusted. 7/
A/  See Zellner (1962) for the original contribution; and Wallace, Duane,
and Nawaz (1987) for an application similar to thie article.
2/  Intuitively, one would expect larger time and cost overruns to be
associated with larger rate-of-return discrepancies. For a wide range of
projects, the standard deviation of re-estimated rates of return increases
only moderately with appraisal rates of return (from  9 percentage points for
projects with AERR's of 10-20%, to 14 percentage points for projects with
AERR's of 30-40%), but it jumps to 25 percentage points for a small number of
projects with higher AERR's.- 13 -
18.  Although a number of techniques exist to correct the standard error.
of estimates (eee e.g., White, 1980), one can more easily eliminate the
problem by transforming variables in such a way that the error term is
constant.  Thus, in the second type of regression model used in this paper we
take as the dependent variable the percentage change of re-estimated over the
appraisal rate of return (Y  =  (RERR  - AERR)/AERR).  This transformation
eliminates heteroskedasticity, but at cost of losing interestJ%q information
about the relationship between the appraisal and re-estimated rates of
return. 8/  For this reason we shall report the results from both types of
regression.
19.  Besides heteroskedasticity, the nature of our data set gives rise to
another statistical problem - censoring of re-estimated rates of return.
Although from the Table 1 it appears that the range of variation of re-
estimated rates of return is wide enough to make plausible the assumption of
an approximately normal distribution of residuals, in reality there is a
considerable piling up of RERR's at a cutoff point of -5 percent. 9/  This
reflects the established practice in the World Bank,  whereby a project deemed
A third approach is to eliminate projects with very high appraisal
rates of return, as these may have an extraordinarily strong influence over
the results.  Projects with such high appraisal ERRs often are due to major
changes in expectations and usually involve comparatively small investments
(e.g. energy conservation, resource discoveries, technological breakthroughs).
2/  About 7 percent of projects are assigned this rate of return.- 14 -
to be a complete  failure  usually  gets a -5  percent  rate  of return  at
completion.  10/
20.  From an econometric  point  of view,  the  presence  of thie cutoff  point
implies  that  we are  dealing  with a censored  sample,  as some  observations  of
the  re-estimated  ERR  that correspond  to known  values  of time  and cost  overruns
are  not  observable,  being  instead  arbitrarily  assigned  the  RERR  of -5 percent.
The  difficulty  with  OLS estimation  based  on censored  data samples  is that  the
least  squares  estimators  of regression  parameters  are  biased  and inconsistent,
using  either  the  entire  sample  or the  subsample  of complete
observationse.  11/  This  kind  of data  are  best  analyzed  within  the
framework  of the censored  regression  model,  also  known  as the Tobit  model (see
Tobin,  1958). A number  of techniques  are  now  available  to.  estimate  Tobit
models  (see,  e.g.,  Amemiya,  1984).  To generate  more  efficient  parameter
estimates  we used  the  maximum  likelihood  technique,  which  yields  estimators
with several  desirable  asymptotic  properties.  1_2/
10/  Another  such  practice  is that  projects  with appraisal  rates  of return
of less  than 10  percent  usually  are  not  considered  for  approval.
Theoretically,  in  the  presence  of this  cutoff  point  the  data  set  would  be
truncated:  valu's  of time and  cost  overruns  and  RERR's  would  be known  only
when  AERR's  at or above  10 percent  were  observed,  so  we could  make  no
inference  on the  potential  performance  of projects  that  were not  accepted  for
financing.  However,  in the  data  set  there  are  46  projects  (4.5  percent  of the
total)  that  were approved  even  though  they had  AERR's  less  than  10 percent,  so
information  on normally  "unobservatle"  projects  actually  is not  missing.
11/  For  analysis  of censored  data  samples  see,  e.g.,  Maddala  (1983);  or
Judge,  Hill,  Griffiths,  Lutkepohl,  and  Lee (1985).
.1_2/  MLE estimators  are  asymptotically  unbiased,  consistent,
asymptotically  efficient,  and  distributed  asymptotically  normally. For
maximum  likelihood  estimation  see,  e.g.,  Greene,  1990. MLE estimates  of Tobit
regression  models  in  this  paper  were  computed  using  the  procedure  LIFEREG  in
the SAS  statistical  package,  version  6.06.- 15  -
21.  The  Tobit  regression  model  for  our  data sample  is of the forms
y,  =xi  4 + el  if  y1 > k,  i - l,...,T-8
a  0  otherwise
and  the corresponding  regression  function  is  given  bys
E(y,fx 1,  y,  >  k)  Xi'  +  ce,
where  y is a  vector  of dependent  variables  (re-estimated  ERR's,  or percentage
changes  thereof  over  the  AERR's);  X is an nxk  matrix  of explanatory  variables;
8  is a vector  of unknown  regression  parameters;  a is  an unknown  scale
parameter;  e and e are  vectors  of errors  assumed  to come  from  the  standard
normal  distribution;  k is the  cutoff  point (-5  percent  for  regressions  where
AERR ie  the dependent  variable,  and  -1 for  regressions  where  the  dependent
variable  is  (RERR-AERR)/AERR));  and  s  observations  out  of T are
unobservable.  13/
B.  Rsults
13/  The  log  likelihood  function  for  this  regression  model is  given  by:
In  L  =  -(n 1/2)fln(2r)+lnO 2J  - (1/2a 2)El(yi-p'xg) 2
+  E0 ln[1-0(#'x 1 /a)  I
where  *(.)  is the standard  normal  cumulative  distribution  function.  First  two
parts  of this function  correspond  to the  classical  regression  for  the
noncensored  observations,  while  the  last  part  are  the relevant  probabilities
for  the  censored  observations.  Although  this  is not  the  usual  type of
likelihood,  Amemiya (1973)  showed  that  proceeding  in  the  usual  fashion  to
maximize  L produces  estimators  with all  desirable  asymptotic  properties.- 16 -
22.  The simplest possible model is to relate only appraisal and re-
estimated rates of return, assuming no other factors have been identified
(Model 1):
RERR =  a +  b AERR +  ou
23.  Maximum likelihood parameter estimates for this model are given in
Table 2, where, for easier interpretation, we also included some summary
statistics obtained from the OLS estimates of this regression. IA/  The
results indicate that economic rates of return re-estimated at project
completion are, on average, considerably lower than appraisal estimates  (b 
0.44).  The intercept is quite large (5.88 percentage points), indicating that
re-estimated rates of return are somewhat higher, relative to appraisal
estimates, for projects with low appraisal rates of return.  A project with an
appraisal rate of return of 10% has a re-estimated rate of return
approximately equal to its appraisal rate of return (5.88 +  0.44 x  10 =
10.28%), while a project with an appraisal rate of return of 30% has, on
average, a re-estimated rate of return of 19% (5.88 +  0.44 x 30).  As
indicated by the low values of standard errors of estimates, both the
intercept and the parameter estimate for AERR are statistically highly
significant. However, the appraisal rate of return explains only 19% of the
variance, indicating a rather loose relationship between rate of return
_14/  Normal scale parameter a does not have an intuitive economic
interpretation, so its estimates will not be reported. In all regressions
where the dependent variable is AERR, the estimates of a are on the order of
about 12 percentage points, and are statistically highly significant.- 17  -
estimates  at appraisal  and completion  of construction,  already  shown
graphically  in Figure  1.
co_t Overruns  and Implementation  Dela_s
24.  Project  cost  overruns  and  implementation  delays  have at times  been  a
considerable  preoccupation  of the Bank's  management,  as they  have  been
intuitively  linked  with  poor  project  performance. They  are  thus  a logical
point  of departure  in  our analysis  of rate-of-return  divergences. Table  2
presents  the  results  of regressions  with  re-estimated  economic  rate  of return
as the  dependent  variable,  and  various  measures  of cost  overruns  as
independent  variables. Model  2 introduces  two  variables  from  the  data  base,
the  nominal  cost  overrun  (in  percent),  and  the  time  overrun  (in  percent).
However,  both  parameter  estimates  are  small  and  statistically  insignificant,
indicating  that  nominal  cost  overruns  and implementation  delays  do not  seem  to
be major  factors  in  explaining  rate  of return  divergences.
25.  Model  3 introduces  two  variables  that  decompose  the  nominal  cost
overrun  into  two  components,  unexpected  inflation  and  real  cost  overruns. The
real  cost overrun  parameter  remains  low  and statistically  insignificant,  while
the unexpected  inflation  variable  is statistically  significant. Since
unexpected  price  increases  have  been  expressed  as  negative  numbers  (reduction
in  the real  value  of available  project  resources),  the  parameter  estimate
implies  that for  projects  with (the  average)  unexpected  increase  in  the price
level  of 20%,  rates  of return  have  been  reduced  by  4.6  percentage  points. The
results  seem  to suggest  that  real increases  in  project  cost  have  had no
systematic  effect  on rates  of return  of World  Bank  projects,  while  unexpected- 18  -
inflationary  pressures  have adversely  affected  the  performance  of Bank
projects,  perhaps  because  of relative  price  changes  between  capital-good
inputs  and  project  outputs.
26.  This regression  also  yields  a statistically  significant  estimate  of
the  time  overrun  variable,  whicb,  surprisingly,  has  the "wrong"  sign.  If, for
example,  it takes  an average  project  58%  more time  to be completed  than
forecasted  at appraisal,  one can  expect  that  this  would  improve  the re-
estimated  ERR by about  0.7  percentage  points.  According  to this result,  the
systematic  bias towards  underestimation  of the  time needed  for  project
completion  may be based  on the  wrong  intuitive  assumption  that long  periods  of
implementation  are  bad for  project  performance.  However,  the  modest  positive
effect  that  time overruns  have  on project  performance  must be  weighted  against
the  much bigger  negative  cost  effects  stemming  from  unexpected  inflation.
27.  Only the introduction  of the  decomposed  cost-overrun  variables  in
Model  3 improves  the  regression  fit  compared  to the  Model  1, as shown  by the
F-test  for  additional  regressors. But  the  adjusted  coefficient  of
determination  (R 2) improves  by only  one  percentage  point (from  19%  to 20%).
The  chi-square  statistic  for  the  White  test (see  White,  1980)  indicates  the
presence  of heteroskedasti"ity  at the 1  percent  test level.- 19 
Ta_ble  2:  Reeressions  with  Cost  Overruns
3xlalnatorv Varlabless  Dependent Variables
Re-estimated,_Rate  of RetuArn  1RERR)
Model 1  Model.2  2  odgL_3
Intercept  5.88  5.25  8.78
(0.76)  (0.88)  (1.26)
Appraisal rate of return (%)  0.44  0.44  0.45
(0.03)  (0.03)  (0.03)
Nominal cost overrun (%)  0.003  -
(0.009)*  -
Time overrun (%)  0.009  0.012
(0.007)*  (0.007)
Unexpected inflation  (-%)  0.23
(0.06)
Real cost overrun (%)  0.01
(0.0l)*
Statistics calculated from the OLS regressions:
Adj. R 2 0.19  0.19  0.20
F-statistic  240  80  64.6
Chi-square statistic for the White test  13.1**  26.8**  40.8**
(Critical value for 1% level)  (9.2)  (21.7)  (29.1)
F-test of the regression  - 0.7  5.0(+)
Values in parentheses are the standard errors.
*  Not eignificant at the 5 percent level.
**  Presence of heteroskedasticity at the 1 percent level of significance.
+  Regression fit improved with respect to the Model 1.
28.  Table 3 presents the results of regressions with the transformed
dependent variable,  (RERR-AERR)/AERR; and the transformed explanatory
variables, (X,  - X,_l)IX,_l,  where t denotes the relevant observation at the
time of completion (e.g., the actual time of construction), and t-l the
appraisal estimate of that same variable:- 20 -
(RERR-AERR)/AERR  - a +  b'[(X,  - Xt..)/Xt_,J  +  ou
29,  In the estimated regressions there is  no heteroskedasticity present
at  the  1% test  level, but nominal cost and time overruns are not statintically
significant, and the estimated parameters have the "wrong" sign.  The
decomposition of nominal cost overruns into unexpected inflation and real cost
overruns helps somewhat, as the parameter estimate for the unexpected
inflation variable now Is statistically significant and has the expected
(positive) sign (faster than expected inflation is a negative number). An
unexpected price increase of 20% (the  average for the sample) would thus give
rise to a 73 percent rate-of-return discrepancy (3.63x20).  However, although
Model 5 significantly improves the otherwise poor fit of Model 4, the total
explained variance of only 3% remains surprisingly low.
30.  Project-specific real cost overruns thus do not seem to affect ex-
post rates of return as adversely as one would expect.  This may be due to the
possibility that projects with large real costs overruns (up  to almost 400%)
reflect mostly expansions of projects, rather than errors in cost estimates.
To the extent that later project phases lead to efficiency gains, one would
expect improvements in the rate of return from such mislabeled "real cost
overruns."- 21 -
Table  3:  Regression.  with Coat  Overruas
XxgLiM_a_9LI  aK;blaS:  Pg  st  Vakriable:
(AERR-AERRL  /AERR
modal  4  Model  5
Intercept  -101.42  -40.76
(7.89)  (12.72)
Nominal cost overrun (%)  0.07  -
(0.11)*  -
Time overrun  (%)  0.01  0.03
(0.01)*  (0.08)*
Unexpected inflation  (-%)  3.63
(0.70)
Real cost overrun (%)  0.14
(0.14)*
Statistics calculated from the OLS regressions:
Adj. R 2 0.0012  0.032
F-statistic  0.59  11.029
Chi-square statistic for the White test  9.38  17.40
(Critical value at 1% level)  (15.1)  (21.7)
F-test of the regression  28.8(+)
Values in parentheses are the standard errors.
*  Not significant at the 5 percent level of significance.
+  Regression fit improved with respect to the Model 4.
Primary Commodity Prices
31.  Since about 40% of the projects in the sample are agricultural
projects, unexpected changes in commodity prices might explain a  substantial
part of the rate of return gap.  We have chosen the ratio of the Bank  lea  lSA
commodity price index for 33 primary commodities (excluding energy) at project
completion, to the same index at the time of project appraisal, as a  measure
of the extent of unexpected commodity price changes during project- 22 -
implementation.  12/  Since  the Bank's  real  commodity  price  index  is
deflated  by the  price  index  of exports  of manufactured  goods  of industrial
countries  (the  "MWUV"  index),  collinearity  between  the "unexpected  commodity
price  changes"  variable  and  the  other  price  variables  has  been  eliminated.
32.  Table  4 gives  the  results  of regressions  with  this additional
explanatory  variable. The  estimate  for  the "unexpected  commodity  price
changes"  variable  is statistically  significant,  and  its inclusion  improves  the
fit  of regression,  as  measured  by t'.a  F-test,  with  respect  to Models  3 and  5.
The  explained  variance  (R 2) increases  by about  1.5  percentage  points,  which  is
quite  respectable  compared  to regressions  with  other  variables,  but the
unexplained  variance  nevertheless  remains  very large. The  parameter  estimates
imply  that an unexpected  decline  in commodity  prices  by 10%  would  result  in a
reduction  of the rate  of return  by 0.8  percentage  points  (Model  3A),  or 12%
(Model  SA).  16/  A  similar  analysis  also  was  carried  out for  agricultural
projects,  using  a real  agricultural  commodity  price  index,  and  the results
were analogous.  The use  of individual  commodity  price  indices  (e.g.,  coffee
price  index  for  coffee  projects)  probably  would  show  greater  sensitivity  of
some  types  of projects  to specific  commodity  price  changes,  but  the  number  of
15/  This  measure  again  is based  on an adaptive  expectations  model  of
price  expectations  at  the  World  Bank (see  the  Annex).
15i/  The unexpected  commodity  price  changes  are  measured  as an index
number,  so no change  corresponds  to the  index  value  of 1.0,  and  a 10%  change
to the index  value  of 1.1  or 0.9;  hence,  for  a 10%  decline  in expected  prices,
the  RERR is expected  to decline  by 8.19x(1.0-0.9).  Notice  that  in Model  5A the
high  estimated  values  of the intercept  term (-160.58)  and  the  commodity  price
parameter  (118.95)  actually  must  be set  against  each  other  for  the zero
expected  price  change  to give,  approximately  ,the  intercept  term  from  Model  5.
The same  would  hold  true  of Model  3A if  the intercept  estimate  were
statistically  significant.- 23 -
observations is too emall to permit much further disaggregation.  Also,  many
agricultural projects are multi-purpose projects (e.g., irrigation) for which
the broad commodity price index may be more useful.
Table 4t  Commodity Price Expectations
Explanatory Variables:  Dependent Variable:t
B"  (RERR-AERR-RMERROI
Nodel 3A  Model 5A
Intercept  0.96  -160.58
(2.72)*  (27.23)
Appraisal ERR (%)  0.46  -
(0.03)  _
Time overrun  (%)  0.015  0.07
(0.007)  (0.08)*
Unexpected inflation  (-%)  0.19  3.06
(0.06)  (0.70)
Real cost overrun  (%)  0.006  0.09
(0.01)*  (0.14)*
Unexpected change in commodity  8.19  118.95
prices (%)  (2.35)  (27.44)
Statistics calculated from the OLS regressions:
Adj. R2 0.214  0.045
F-statistic  54.9  i1.9
Chi-square statistic for the White test  63.7**  23.7
(Critical value for 1% level)  (37.6)  (29.1)
F-test of the regression  6.8+  14.0+
Values in parentheses are the standard errors.
*  Not significant at the 5% level.
**  Presence of heteroskedasticity at the 1% test level.
+  Regression fit improved with respect to models 3 and 5.
Economic Manaaement Factors
33.  A second set of factors that could help explain some of the
divergence in rate-of-return estimates between the appraisal and completion of
construction are the country-specific factors, such as the human resource
endowment, the type of economic policies pursued by the government, the-24-
efficiency  of public  administration,  and so  on.  of course,  these  are  complex
factors  that  are not  easily  measurable  and  we have  to  make do with a few
quantitative  indicators,  such  as adult  literacy,  per capita  income,  an index
of price  distortions  for  the 1970e  (Agarwala,  1983)  and  the  Bankle  internal
ranking  of the  quality  of government's  economic  policies  and  management  (as  of
1978,  taken  as representative  for  the 1970s).
34.  It should  be noted  that  these  factors  should  have  been  taken  into
account  by project  evaluators,  and factored  into  the  appraisal  estimate  of the
rate  of return,  and,  more importantly,  into  project  design  (for  example,  the
extent  of expatriate  project  management  services  employed  to ensure  the
success  of the  project). The  parameter  estimates  for  these  variables  thus
need  to be interpreted  as the  degree  to which  project  evaluators  did  not
sufficiently  take account  of these  factors. In  all  cases  it can  be reasonably
assumed  that  project  evaluators  were aware  of these  country-specific  factors
at the time  of appraisal. Only in  the case  of the  Agarwala  price-distortion
index  could  one  possibly  argue  that there  is  some "benefit  of hindsight"  at
work,  as the  extent  of price  distortions  and  their  negative  consequences  may
not  have  been fully  appreciated. But  Agarwala's  index  is  based  mostly  on
relatively  easily  available  economic  data  that (at  loast  in  their  raw form)
were already  available  at appraisal. Moreover,  the  Bank's  internal  rating  of
economic  management  performance  is fairly  closely  related  to the  price
distortion  index  (the  coefficient  of  correlation  between  the two  ratings  is
-0.67).- 25 -
35.  Table 5 presents the results of regressions with country-specific
variables added. The implementation delay and the decomposed cost-overrun
variables from Models 3A and 5A have been retained. Most of the new variables
are statistically significant (the economic management performance ranking,
and the price distortion index are used as alternative indicators).
Table 5:  Country-Specific Economic Management Factors i/
Explanatory Variables:  Dependent Variables:
RERR  (RERR-AERRi  LAHRR
Model 3B  Model 3C  Model 5B  Model SC
Intercept  -11.47  0.2*  -194.05  -68.66*
Appraisal ERR (%)  0.46  0.47  - -
Time overrun (%)  0.01*  0.01*/  -0.02*  -0.002*
unexpected inflation  (-%)  0.15  0.16  2.78  2.87
Real cost overrun  (%)  0.003*  0.004*  0.18*  0.17*
Unexpected change in commodity
prices (%)  9.49  9.60  103.58  105.46
New:
Economic management rating b/  0.42*  - 6.07*/  -
Agarwala price-distortion index £/  - -5.48  - -63.46
Log (GNP)  1.84  2.06  10.12*  15.66
Adult literacy  -0.06  -0.07  -0.82  -0.93
Statistics calculated from the OLS regressions:
Adj. R2 0.23  0.24  0.05  0.07
F-test of new regressors  4.5+  7.2+  4.7+  7.9+
Values in parentheses are the standard errors.
*  Not significant at the 5% level.
*/  Not significant at the 5% level, but significant at the 10%.
+  Regression fit improved with respect to the Model 3A or 5A.
a/  All regressions in this table are run for 31 countries (612 projects)
for which the Agarwala price distortion index was available.
k/  As of 1973, on a scale of 1 to 10; lowest actual rating is 2.
c/  Ranges from 1.14 for Malawi (lowest  distortion), to 2.86 for Ghana
(highest  distortion).- 26  e
36.  Interestingly, the Agarwala price-distortion index performs
statistically considerably better than the Bank's rating of economic
management performance. This is surprising, since the latter is based on the
same economic data p.lus  management's judgments based on qualitative insights.
Apparently, the relatively simplistic  procedure of adding up price distortions
works better than a careful review process using qualitative judgments.  In
all model specifications, replacing the economic performance rating with the
price distortion index results in statistically significant parameter
estimates, a higher R2, and in considerably higher values of F-tests for
inclusion the new regressors (see  Table 5).  For the actual range of the price
distortion index (from 1.14 to 2.86), the parameter estimates imply a 9.4
percentage points (Model 3C) lower re-estimated ERR in a country with high
price distortions  (such  as Ghana during the 1970s), compared to a country with
low price distortions (such  as Malawi). 17/  The adverse effects on
project performance of government interventions through price controls, high
tariffs, import restrictions, etc., thus have been considerably underestimated
in World Bank project appraisals.
37.  However, despite these rather high parameter estimates, poor economXic
management and price distortions explain only about 2% of the rate of return
gap, inching the total explained variance (Model 3C) to only 24%.  The other
two variables (level of income and adult literacy) have been introduced as
(albeit crude) indicators of the human capital stock, and their parameter
17/  Calculated as -5.48x(2.86-1.14)=9.43. Another interpretation can be
given in terms of the Model 5C. If, for example, the average ERR discrepancy
in a low-distortion country is 20%, then one can expect a 42% discrepancy in a
high-distortion country (20x[-63.46x(2.86-l.14)J.- 27 
eatimatea are statistically significant.  For a halving of per capita income
from, say, $1000  to $500, ex-post rates of return are lower by about 1.4
percentage points (Model 3C); or about 11 percent (Model SC). 18/  This
suggests that  the  Bank's project evaluators have tended to overestimate
project implementation capabilities in the poorest countries.  Surprisingly,
the parameter estimate  for the adult literacy variable has the "wrong" sign,
indicating that re-estimated rates of return are lower in countries with
higher adult literacy rates  (for similar projects and levels of income). This
can be explained by the fact that countries with high rates of literacy tend
to engage in projects involving more sophisticated technology, that brings
higher rates  of return, but at higher risk, so that the rate-of-return
discrepancy  also  is greater.
Sectoral and Geographic Differences
38.  There are a number of ways to analyze the differences between the
various types of projects.  One is to introduce dummy (0,1)  variables
comparing different groups of projects.  Another approach would be to run the
same set of regressions on different (sectoral  or geographic) subsets of
projects to see whether there are statistically significant differences in
parameter estimates. Table 6 presents estimates of regressions with both
sectoral and regional dummy variables added to Models 3B and SB, now labeled
"3D" and "5D', respectively. 19/  Agriculture and South Asia were selected
1fi/  Calculated as 2.06(lnlOOO-lnSOO)-1.43; and l5.66(lnlOOO-ln500)=10.85.
19_/  Although it would have been preferable to use Models 3C and 5C
instead of 3B and 5B (as  the Agarwala index performs better), this would have
limited the sample to only 31 countries and 612 projects, instead of the
entire sample of 1,015 projects.- 28 
as the  standard  to which  other  sectors  and  regions  are  compared,  so parameter
estimates  for  sectoral  and  regional  dummy  variables  indicate,  e.g.,  how  the
energy  projects,  or projects  in  the  Mediterranean  region,  perform  relative  to
agricultural  projects  in South  Asia.
39.  The explanatory  power  of both  regressions  increases  considerably
following  on the introduction  of dummy  variables  (from  an adjusted  R 2 of 0.21
to 0.31 in the  case  of Model  3D;  and  from  0.03  to 0.12 in  the case  of  Model
5D).  These  variables  thus  contribute  more  to the improved  regression  fit  than
all  the  previously  introduced  variables  together  (with  the  exception  of the
appraisal  rate of return  in  Models  1  to 3).  There  thus appear  to be clusters
of projects  with similar  characteristics  and  problems.
40.  Parameter  estimates  for  sectoral  dummy  variables  show  that  projects
in  our data sample  roughly  fall  into  two  categories.  Since  the  estimates  for
the intercept  (i.e.,  agriculture),  energy,  and  industry  all  are insignificant,
the  results  of Model  3D indicate  that,  other  things  being  equal,  projects  with
an appraisal  rate  of return  of, say,  20 percent  that are  undertaken  in  these
three  sectors  are  expected  to have  a re-estimated  ERR  of about  9  percent,  or
11 percentage  points  below  the  estimate.  on  the  other  hand,  transport  projects
are  expected  to have a re-estimated  ERR  about  4 percentage  points  below  the
estimate  (7.62  + 120x0.431),  and  urban  development  projects  about  2 percentage- 29 -
Table 6:  Rearessions with  eflctoral  & Relaional  Dummv Variables
Exilanatorv Variables:  Doenndenkt  VAriablsI
am RRER&AMERI  /ME
Model 3D  Model SD
Intercept  0.45*  -175.15
Appraisal ERR (%)  0.43  -
Time overrun (%)  -0.007*  -0.07*
Unexpected inflation (-E)  0.12  2.55
Real cost overrun (%)  0.006*  0.12*
Economic management rating  0.83*  6.53
Log (GNP)  -0.50*  11.94*
Adult literacy (%)  -0.04*/  -0.73
Unexpected commodity price changes (%)  6.45  90.49
Sectoral Dummies:
Energy  0.96*  27.41
Transport  7.62  63.58
Industry  -0.88*  -29.51*/
Urban  9.51  -8.55*
Regional Dummies:
East Africa  -12.54  -94.82
CFA countries  -8.02  -52.88
Other West Africa  -9.92  -96.87
East Asia  -3.64  -24.24*
Mediterranean  -6.92  -62.33
Latin America  -7.11  -63.04
Statistics calculated from the OLS regressions:
Adj. R2 0.309  0.121
F-test of regression  13.6(+)  8.1(+)
*  Not significant at the 5 percent level.
*/  Not significant at the 5% level, but significant at the 10% level.
+  Regression fit improved with respect to Models 3B and 5B.- 30 -
points below the estimate. 20/  Re-estimated rates of return for projects
the transport and urban development sectors thus are generally closer to the
appraisal rates of return than is the case for projects in agriculture,
energy, and industry.  This pattern probably reflects two factorst  (L) the
relatively simple technology and organization of transport and urban
development projects, compared to industrial and energy projects; and ($i)  the
effect of international markets on industrial and agricultural projects.
Projects producing traded goods seem to be exposed to a higher degree of
downside risks, and this may be related to international competition (i.e.,
competitors in other countries may be more productive and this may lead to
lower prices for outputs, and sharply lower returns).
41.  Parameter estimates for regional dummy variables all have negative
sign, implying that re-estimated rates of return are highest in South Asia
(the standard of comparison), followed by the projects in East Asia, with
slightly lower (3.6%) rates of return. Projects in Latin America, the
Mediterranean, and the French African Community (CFA)  are next on the list,
while projects in East and West Africa (other  than the CFA zone) have
performed particularly poorly. The better performance of CFA members compared
to other African countries points to the importance of the institutional
framework and, in particular, the conservative fiscal and monetary policies.
It is interesting to note that the project implementation performance in CFA
2-0/  This pattern is roughly confirmed by the results of Model 5D, where
the greatest rate-of-return discrepancy is for industry, then for agriculture
and energy projects, while transport projects again have the lowest ERR
discrepancy. Correct interpretation of figures in Table 6 is more complicated,
though, because we neglected the term oc;  the scale parameter for Model 3D is
11.4,  and  for  Model 5D it is 113.- 31 -
member countries during the 1960s and 1970s is comparable to the average of
other developing countries  (i.e.,  Mediterranean and Latin America), but very
different from other African countries.
42.  This is corroborated by an analysis of failed projects.  Out of 80
"total" project failures (i.e. negative rates of return at project
completion), 27 are in East Africa, with Tanzania alone accounting for 11
project failures.  Failed projects largely are concentrated in agriculture, as
nearly two-thirds of all project failures world-wide have been agricultural
projects, particularly complex "new style" area or rural development projects
started in the mid-1970.  (see  Table 7).  Agricultural projects in Sub-Saharan
Africa have experienced an unacceptable failure rate, with one-half of all
projects in East Africa, and more than one quarter of all projects in West
Africa yielding re-estimated rates of return below 5%.  There is again a
strong distinction in West Africa between CFA members and other countries.- 32 -
Table 7,  Protect Failures by Reffons & Sector
Percentage of projects with
re-estimated  rates  of retu-rn  belows
All Proists  25.2  13.6  .?.
East Africa  41.1  27.9  17.1
West Africa:
CFA member countries  21.8  18.2  10.0
Other West Africa  37.5  19.6  16.1
Mediterranean  29.1  14.3  7.4
Latin America  25.1  10.2  5.1
South Asia  14.7  6.4  1.1
East Asia  12.5  5.2  4.2
Agricultural Projects  29.0  19.8  12.7
- in East Africa  61.4  52.9  37.1
- in CFA members  34.0  26.0  16.0
- in other West Africa  45.8  33.3  29.0
43.  A more informative approach to the analysis of the regional
performance of projects is to run regressions for each sector separately.
Resulte of these regressions are presented in Table 8.  To save space, only
the results for Model 3D are shown.  (The  pattern of parameter estimates for
Model SD is eimilar.)  Compared to the combined sample (Table 6), the
disaggregated regressions by sector have fewer statistically significant
parameters, and parameter estimates for some variables are very different from
eector to sector.  For the appraisal  rate of return, the parameter estimates
fall into two sets:  relatively high (0.61  - 0.67) for infrastructure projects
and low (0.21 - 0.25) for agricultural and industrial projects, indicating
that downside risks are larger (or  have been underestimated) in the directly
productive sectors.  Unexpected movements in primary commodities (excluding- 33 -
energy) seem to have affected industrial projects even more than agricultural
projects (most of the industrial.projects in the sample are import-
substituting raw materials projects - e.g. fertilizer industry).
Table  8:  Rearessiong  b2y  Sector
Explanatory Variables:  pependent,Variablels  AERR (Model 3D)
Aariculture  !aeray  Zunaogrt  zfdumtrv
Intercept  6.66*  10.26*/  7.36*  -15.55*
Appraisal ERR (%)  0.21  0.61  0.67  0.25
Time overrun (%)  -0.02*.  0.002*  -0.01*  -0.02*
Unexpected inflation  (-%)  0.11*  0.29  0.11*  -0.05*
Real cost overrun (%)  0.03  -0.02*  -0.01*  -0.04
Economic management rating  0.61*  1.17  0.52*  -1.72
Log (GNP)  0.82*  -1.21*  0.62*  2.35*
Adult literacy (%)  -0.09  0.03*  -0.03*  0.10*/
Unexpected commodity price changes (%)  11.12  1.92*/  4.36*  15.72
Regional Dummies
East Africa  -18.18  -5.09  -12.83  -14.06
CFA countries  -12.64  2.91*  -10.38  -
Other West Africa  -17.37  -7.89  -6.33*/  -
East Asia  -3.29*/  -4.42*/  -7.65  5.24*/
Mediterranean  -6.34  -7.46  -7.38*/  -4.11*
Latin America  -8.34  -6.76  -6.97*/  -2.81*
Number of projects  411  216  310  56
Statistics calculated from OLS regressions:
Adj. R2 0.25  0.30  0.32  0.33
Adj. R2 without regional dummies  0.11  0.29  0.29  0.03
*  Not significant at the 5% level.
*/  Not significant at the 5% level, but significant at the 10% level.
44.  Unexpected inflation seems to have affected particularly the more
capital-intensive infrastructure projects, but may also reflect delayed
adjustments in government price regulations in the case of the electric power34 -
sector,  where  the  Bank's  methodology  does  not  conform  to the  principles  of
cost-benefit  analysis. The  economic  management  rating  also shows  some
perplexing  sectoral  differences,  with a negative  parameter  estimate  for
industrial  projects  which  may  be the  consequence  of a few  conspicuous  project
failures  in  countries  with high  performance  ratings. A separate  analysis  for
agricultural  projects  showed  that  the  Agarwala  price  distortion  index  performs
dramatically  better  than  the economic  performance  ranking  in  that sector.
Trends  over time
45.  An analysis  of appraisal  and  re-estimated  rates  of return  by year of
approval  shows  that  the rate  of return  gap has  increased  considerably  over
time.  Projects  appraised  in the  1960s  showed  little  difference  between
average  rates  of return  at appraisal  and  completion  and  ann-ual  variations  were
tracked  quite  closely. Appraisal  and  re-estimated  rates  of return  started  to
diverge  in  the early  1970s. The  main reason  appears  to have  been increasing
optimism  of project  evaluators,  with average  appraisal  rates  of return  rising
from about  16% for  projects  evaluated  in  the  mid-1960s  to 20-25%  for  projects
evaluated  in the  mid  and late  1970s. By  contrast,  average  rates  of return  at
project  completion  showed  a persistent  downtrend  for  projects  appraised  during
1970-76  before  recovering  again  for  projects  appraised  a.ound  1980 (and
evaluated  in 1985-87).
46.  The  downtrend  in average  re-estimated  rates  of return  for  projects
appraised  in  the  early  1970s  was  most likely  due  to external  circumstances,
that is,  the  recession  and low  commodity  prices  at the  time these  projects
were completed  in  the late  1'q70s  and  early  1980s. The increasing  rates  of- 35 -
return  at appraisal  during  the 1970.  probably  reflect  Bank-internal  factors,
includlng  the  ohift  Ln Bank  lending  from  Lnfrastructure  to agriculture  and
industry. In terms  of average  outcomes  at project  completion,  the  vastly
expanded  lending  program  of the 1970s  does not  compare  too  unfavorably. Re-
estlmated  ratee  of return  for  the 1970s  are not  very  dlfferent  from  those  for
the 1960s. The sharp  increase  in  re-estimated  returns  for  projects  appraised
in 1980  must be interpreted  with  caution,  as it includes  only a small
percentage  of projects  of that  appraisal  year.- 36 -
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C.  Conclusions
47.  The statistical analysis of rates of return estimates before and
after completion of project construction provides a numner of interesting
insights.  First, it points to the large degree of uncertainty surrzunding the
rate-of-return estimates.  Second, World Bank appraisal estimates of rates of
return are biased, that is, too optimistic.  If  this degree of optimism is- 37 -
shared by other project evaluators, one should expect that the  "discount rate
that just rations investment projects to the funds available" exceeds  the ex-
post rate of return by a considerable margin.  The  analytical treatment of
project risks thus deserves more attention in practice.  Anderson and Quiggin
(1990), for example, argue that project implementation variables usually enter
project analysis on a "no surprises" basis, corresponding to the modal value
of the  distribution  of possible  outcomes.  Since  surprises  are  mostly
unpleasant, the probability distribution of project implementation outcomes is
skewed (a longer tail in the downside direction).  If one were to allow for
the skewed distribution  ("bad  surprises"), one could correct the bias in the
estimate.
48.  However, factors that have conventionally been associated with this
bias (cost  overruns, implementation delays) seem to explain only a very small
part of the unexpected changes in project performance (measured  by the rate of
return gap).  Interestingly, uncertainties seem to be higher in the directly
productive sectors (agriculture, industry), where rates of return can be
altered through external market forces or domestic policy shocks.  Rate-of-
return estimates seem to be more stable for infrastructure projects.
49.  As an alternative to correcting modal estimates of implementation
variables for "bad surprises", one could set different minimum rate-of-return
criteria for different types of project (e.g. 10% for transport, but 15% for
agricultural and industrial projects), based on observed rate-of-return
divergences.- 38  -
50.  The analysis  also  has  pointed  to the importance  of the  policy
environment  for  successful  project  implementation.  The "ec,nomic  management
rating"  and "price  distortion"  variables  both indicate  that  project  evaluators
did  not  take  the adverse  effects  of  poor economic  policies  at the  macro-
economic  level  sufficiently  into  account. More puzzling  though,  is  the fact
that regional  dummy  variables  also  seem  to operate  partly  as economic
management  variables,  and  have  considerably  more explanatory  power  than  direct
indicatore  of the  quality  of economic  management  and  institutions.
51.  The  fact  that  projects  in  member  countries  of the  French  African
Community  seem  to perform  almost  as well  as those  in  other  regions,  shows  that
the  high failure  rate  of projects  elsewhere  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa  seems  to be
related  primarily  to policies  and  institutions,  and  not  to some  deeper  and
immutable  factors. However,  the  better  performance  of projects  in  CFA
countries  during  the 1960  and  the 1970s  is no guarantee  that  this  will  be
repeated  during  the 1980s,  as external  competitiveness  of the  CFA zone  has
considerably  deteriorated.
52.  The analysis  of observed  rate-of-return  divergences  raises  more
questions  than it can  answer. The  high  degree  of revealed  uncertainty  also
raises  the  question  whether,  and  what kind  of,  improvements  in  the  methodology
will contribute  to b-tter  investment  decisions. Cost-benefit  analysis  remains
primarily  a tool for  the  planner,  and  it shares  his  achilles  heelt  the  high
cost  of information  in  an uncertain  world.- 39
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ANNEX
Derivation of Constant Price Proiect Data
(i)  Project cost estimates for World Bank projects are made in current US
dollars, since this is the unit of account for the Bank.  Appraisal estimates
for a project are made on the basis of prevailing prices at the time of
appraisal, a forecast of price changes for internationally traded capital
goods (in terms of US dollars), and the projected expenditure (disbursement)
profile.  Project cost estimates also include a physical contingency for
unexpected expenditures.  Project costs at project completion are, similarly,
the sum of annual expenditures in (actual) current prices ("mixed year
dollars").
(ii)  In periods of unexpectedly high inflation (or for projects with major
implementation delays) re-estimated nominal project costs sometimes are
substantially higher than appraisal estimates, but real project costs may not
have increased at all.  To separate nominal from real cost overruns, we
dez1ved real (constant price) cost estimates for each project for both
appraisal and project completion, by deflating yearly project expenditures
with the projected and actual price index for capital goods (the Bank's
"Manufactured Unit Value"  (MUV) index for exports of manufactured goods of
industrial countries).
(iii)  While forecasts for the MWV index  were available for the past ten
years, we did not have earlier forecasts, and had to estimate the price
contingency vectors.  Visual inspection of price forecasts for the past ten42  -
years suggested that the Bank's price  forecasts followed an "adaptive
expectations" pattern:  projections seemed to be based on recent price trends.
Several adaptive expectations models were tested, and we found that the
projections were best approximated by a  five-year moving average adaptive
expectations model.
(iv)  The first stage prediction of the MUV index was made by calculating
the five year moving average:
MUV  '  [MUV',-  +  ...  +  MUV,-51/5
The moving average values (MUV')  were then used to calculate the average
deviation from the actual value of the index (MUV' - MUV)/MUV and this
estimate was used as a correction parameter,  3,  in the adaptive expectationS
model:
MLVt*  MUw'It_  +  n  (MUVt  X  - MUV't-:),  o<I3<l
That is,  the forecasting  error  for  the  previous  period,  MUV 1 _.  - MUV't_l  is
corrected with a fraction B  (the average error), thereby improving upon
("adapting to") the first-stage forecast.
(v)  The real cost at appraisal price projections, pa,  is thent
ta
Xa (p)  =  E  ca/ta  ,  where
j1  pja
Xa  =  real cost at appraisal
t^  =  projected duration of project implementation
ca  =  nominal cost estimate at appraisal
pjl  - projected price vector at appraisal- 43 -
and  the  real cost  at actual  pricest
to
r(pc) * E  S  ,  where
jul  pja
IV  - real coat  based  on actual  nominal  expenditures  (cc),  actual
implementation  duration  (t 0), and  actual  prices  (p 0)
(vi)  The  real cost  overrun  is  thent
[10(p0 )  - Xa(pc)J1/X(pc)
and  the  unexpected  inflation,  as defined  in  the  paper:
(X'(p 0) - Xa(pA)]/X-(p)
Note  that unexpectedly  high  inflation  (pP  >  pe) is  a negative  number  according
to  this  definition.  This  is reflected  in the  minus  sign  before  the  percentage
sign  in  the  tablee  with  the statistical  results  (-%).- 44 -
Table Al:  Actual and Predicted Changem in the MUV Xndox
1961-1987 (%)
Year  Actual  Predicted L&
1961  1.7  -3.9
1962  2.0  0.7
1963  -1.9  1.3
1964  2.3  0.0
1965  0.6  0.7
1966  3.5  1.0
1967  0.9  1.6
1968  -0.6  1.3
1969  5.2  0.9
1970  6.1  2.5
1971  5.5  3.3
1972  8.9  3.8
1973  16.1  5.7
1974  21.7  9.7
1975  11.2  13.4
1976  1.4  12.7
1977  9.9  10.1
1978  14.9  11.8
1979  13.4  12.1
1980  9.7  10.5
1981  0.5  9.8
1982  -1.4  8.4
1983  -2.5  6.0
1984  -1.7  -3.6
1985  1.1  0.8
1986  18.3  -0.8
1987  10.6  4.9
Mean  5.8  4.6
Standard deviation  6.8  5.0
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